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Dragica Vujadinović, Belgrade / Serbia 
 
Ethics and Morality in Dworkin’s Political Philosophy 
 
Abstract: Dworkin`s political theory is characterized by the interpretative integrity of morality, law, and 
politics, the so-called “hedgehog’s approach”. The interpretative integrity approach functions on multiple 
levels. Firstly, philosophical foundations of his theory of justice are linked to his conception of just liberal 
society and state. Secondly, from the perspective of political morality, interpretative concepts of law and 
morality  are  internally  connected,  in  addition  to  interpretative  concepts  of  equality,  liberty,  and 
democracy.  Thirdly,  from  the  perspective  of  philosophical  foundations,  individual  ethics,  personal 
morality  and  political  morality  are  mutually  connected.  The  aforementioned  ethical  and  moral 
foundations are also related – in a wider sense of philosophical foundations - with his gnoseological 
conception  regarding  value  concepts  in  law,  politics  and  morality,  and  with  his  episthemological 
conception regarding an objective truth in the field of values, in a sense that the value concepts are 
interpretative and can be objectively true when articulated in accordance with methodological rules and 
standards of a »reflexive equilibrium« and an interpretative integrity, and in accordance with the so-
called internal scepticism in the context of value pluralism.  
The term “ethics” in a “narrower” sense refers to individual ethics, the study of how to live well, 
while the “ethics” in a “broader” sense refers to personal morality, the study of how we must treat other 
people. The term “morality” however, is used primarily to denote a political morality, the issue of how a 
sovereign power should treat its citizens. 
Philosophical foundations of Dworkin`s political theory of justice, his conception of two cardinal 
values of humanity, his concievement of individual ethics, personal morality and political morality will be 
in the focus of consideration. 
Key  words:  Dworkin,  individual  ethics,  personal  morality,  political  morality,  equal  concern, 
responsibility, self-respect, authenticity, dignity.  
             
I. General Outline of Dworkin’s Political Theory and Philosophy 
Ronald  Dworkin,  one  of  the  greatest  contemporary  political  and  legal  philosophers,  started 
developing  his  comprehensive  liberal  theory  based  on  the  central  position  of  a  concept  of 
equality, initially in the field of philosophy of law
1 (he returned to the field of jurisprudence with 
                                                           
1 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London 1977; Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge 1985; 
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, Cambridge 1986. Dworkin turned back again to the field of jurisprudence with his 
book Justice in Robes, Cambridge 2006.  
2 
his book Justice in Robes, published in 2006). Further on, Dworkin articulated a liberal political 
theory of justice, as based on an “equality of resources” account of justice, also known as a 
“liberal equality”
2. Finally, he attempted to clarify philosophical foundations
3 of his theory of 
political morality. His latest book  Justice  for  Hedgehogs
4  aspires  to  complete  philosophical 
foundations of his theory, and, more specifically, to illustrate a unity of ethical and moral values. 
Dworkin  has  been  a  liberal  philosopher  who  has  considered  equality  and  liberty  as 
inseparable values. Dworkin has built a normative conception of liberalism which aims at a more 
just society. He has articulated a specific “equality of resources” account of justice and defended 
a “strategy of continuity” between a pluralism of individual ethical and moral conceptions, and a 
devotion of all of them to the common good. Common liberal values unite citizens and are rooted 
in two fundamental principles of humanity - the principle of equal concern and the principle of 
special responsibility. These two fundamental principles jointly express an equal value of each 
human being and a responsibility of each individual for his or her own success in life, on one 
side, and an obligation of a political sovereign to treat each individual equally and to secure all 
possibilities for each individual to fulfill his or her  personal capabilities, on another.    
Dworkin's liberal theory of justice has its philosophical foundations  - located in a more 
general account of human values of ethics and morality (philosophical ethics) - in an axiological 
conception  of  a  status  and  integrity  of  values,  and  in  an  epistemological  conception  of  an 
objective  truth  in  the  field  of  values.  According  to  Dworkin,  law,  politics,  and  morality  are 
characterized  by  value  principles  and  judgements.  Although  criterial  concepts  with  an 
uncontested meaning exist within these fields, there are  primarily existent interpretative value 
concepts, which can be objectively true according to rules and standards of a so-called internal 
scepticism in the context of value pluralism. In short, legal, political, ethical, esthetical statements 
                                                           
2 Dworkin collected all the articles concerned with his liberal political theory of justice, which he had written during 
the previous twenty years, in his book Sovereign Virtue – The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge/London 
2000. 
3 A philosophical conception of morality was initially articulated in the manuscript Ronald Dworkin, “Justice for 
Hedgehogs” (available from http://www.nyu.edu/Accessed August 26, 1999), and also in the Introduction to Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (2000). Philosophical ethics and moral foundations of liberalism and their 
interconnections with the pluralism of individual ethical beliefs are presented in his “Foundations of Liberal 
Equality”, Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. XI, Utah, 1990. 
The axiological/gnoseological conception of the status and the integrity of values is elaborated in his articles: “The 
Foundations of Liberal Equality”, in “Justice for Hedgehogs” and”Interpretation, Morality and Truth” (Available 
from: http: // www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2002/readings/dworkin/dworkin.doc /Accessed 2002/).  
The epistemological explanation of the objective truth in the field of values is given in the article “Objectivity and 
Truth: You’d Better Believe It”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 25, 1996, as well as in the above mentioned article 
“Interpretation, Morality and Truth” (2002).    
4 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge/London 2011.  
3 
are  always  value  statements,  and  analysis  and  decision  making  in  these  fields  have  been 
concerned always and again with the value judgements, which can be objectively true under 
certain conditions.     
The title “Justice for Hedgehogs” was also used for one of the articles, in which Dworkin, 
after publishing Sovereign Virtue and prior to publishing Justice for Hedgehogs, developed his 
philosophical  ethics.  Hedgehogs,  as  opposed to foxes,  are metaphorical explanations  for two 
mutually opposed conceptions of value pluralism, and more generally, for decisions concerned 
with the field of values.  
As Dworkin admits, the title is taken from Isaiah Berlin’s famous elaboration of the Greek 
poet Archilochus’s dictum that the fox knows many things but the hedgehog knows one big 
thing.  In  contrast  to  Berlin
5, who, due to a danger of totalitarian monism, considered the 
intellectuals, writers, philosophers who had been trying to build coherent, centripetal system of 
their beliefs, visions and values, as dangerous  Dworkin aimed at building “one big idea”, an 
interpretative integrity of all concepts related to ethics, morality, politics, law. He agreed with 
Berlin that the beginning and the mid of the 20
th century brought dangers of totalitarian monism 
imposed by socialism and Nazism, but also noticed rival dangers which seemed more real and 
threatening in  mature democracies at  the end of the 20
th century, and  which came out  from 
undiscriminating pluralism.   Dworkin  rejects  the  undiscriminating  pluralism,  e.g.  value 
relativism and the external scepticism.  He says that there are too many examples of disregard of 
justice, justified by the  argument that too  much attention has  been paid to  human rights,  to 
demands of minority groups, or to equality instead of the value of liberty. Dworkin also remarks 
that there are too many examples of a failure to condemn inequalities, injustices and oppression 
on different continents, covered by the excuse that our cultural imperialism must be avoided.  
Dworkin accepts only the internal scepticism; he considers all relevant concepts of morality, 
politics and law as value concepts, and believes in the existence of a certain kind of an objective 
truth  in  the  field  of  values.  He  affirms  a  unity  of  values,  a  value  as  a  one  big  thing,  and 
interpretative integrity of all relevant value concepts and value statements as the true ones. 
Dworkin disagrees with Rawls’s claim that an overlapping consensus is possible among 
different and mutually conflicting comprehensive moral positions (theories), where all of them 
will give priority to what is just rather than to what is good, hence supporting the political theory 
of justice. If a conflict between private conceptions of good/individual interests and a common 
                                                           
5 Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: an Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History, London 1953.  
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good/justice is accepted as a premise, there is no guarantee that the justice will be accepted by the 
public. A consensus is both impossible and not guaranteed. Dworkin attempts a different political 
strategy; he speaks about a “democratic dilemma” instead of a Rawlsian “consensual dilemma”. 
His  starting  point  is  what  unites  individuals,  rather  than  what  divides  them.  He  attempts  to 
identify  the  cardinal  values  of  ethical  humanism  which  have  been  widely  shared  among 
individuals in spite of their more concrete ethical and religious disagreements. These are the 
values shared among “enough of us” and make it possible for the “democratic dilemma” to be 
resolved whilst gaining an increasing popularity of these ideals, contrary to the impossibility of 
resolving the “consensual dilemma”.
6 
According  to  Dworkin,  a  comprehensive  and  plausible  liberal  theory  (“political 
perspective”) must be based on a “philosophical perspective”
7, which he characterizes as follows. 
Firstly, it must reflect basic commitments for a value of a human life and for each person’s 
responsibility to realize that value in his/her own life. Secondly, it must show that the central 
political values of democracy, liberty, civil society, and equality have a good status, and that they 
are mutually integrated (growing out of one another and reflecting themselves in all others in a 
sense  which  does  not  indicate  their  simple  compatibility,  but  also  their  inner  indivisibility). 
Thirdly, it must show that the central political values have a status of an objective truth in the 
framework of “the face value view of morality.” 
The  central  part  of  the  philosophical  foundations  belongs  to  two  cardinal  principles  of 
humanism, articulated at the level of political morality (as done in the Sovereign Virtue), as well 
as at the level of individual ethics and individual morality (as done in Justice for Hedgehogs). In 
addition, the axiological conception of integrity of value concepts, the gnoseological conception 
about an interpretative justification of value concepts, and the epistemological conception of an 
objective truth in the field of values, as well as his conception of liberal ethics also belong to the 
aforementioned philosophical foundations. 
A  note  about  Dworkin`s  terminology
8: he uses the term "ethics" in a broader and in a 
narrower sense, as well as the term “morality”. He emphasizes a distinction between ethics, the 
study  of  how  to  live  well,  and  morality,  the  study  of  how  we  must  treat  other  people  (the 
definition of ethics in narrower and broader sense). The term “morality” is mostly used to denote 
a political morality, the issue how a sovereign power should treat its citizens. An additional note 
                                                           
6 Ronald Dworkin, (note 3, 2002), 9-10. 
7 Ronald Dworkin, (note 3, 1990). 
8 R. Dworkin, (note 2, 2000), 8-9.  
5 
is necessary: Dworkin also speaks about “liberal ethics” (he does it only in the “Foundations of 
Liberal  Equality”),  in  a  sense  of  commonly  shared  basic  values  among  liberal  individuals; 
insofar, “liberal ethics” represents a part of his conception of political morality. 
 
II. Philosophical Foundations of Dworkin`s Political Theory 
1. Two Cardinal Values of Humanism (Two Fundamental Principles of Politics) 
A comprehensive liberal theory of justice and political morality is based on two principles of 
ethical individualism: the equal importance/equal concern, and the individual responsibility.  
Dworkin’s interpretation of the principle of equal importance is the most centred in the 
Sovereign Virtue upon an equal concern of a sovereign power for its citizens. The first principle 
states that the legitimacy of a sovereign lies within an equal concern for each and every citizen. 
He concludes that "equal concern... is the special and indispensable virtue of sovereigns."
9 In 
other words, an "equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political community."
10 The bottom line 
is that a sovereign power must secure a just distribution of resources, which is “endowment 
insensitive”  (insensitive  to  differences  in  a  social  status  as  well  as  in  natural  talents  and 
handicaps)  and  “ambition-sensitive”  (sensitive  to  personal  choices).  It  means  that  the  two 
principles  of  humanism  have  to  be  conducted  through  an  implementation  of  Dworkin`s 
conception of justice, e.g. with a help of the “equality of resources” account of justice. 
The  principle  of  the  special/individual  responsibility  is  centred  on  an  individual’s 
responsibility for his/her own life choices, and an individual’s decision as to what is considered a 
successful or damaged life within whichever range of choices are permitted by their resources 
and culture.
11 According to Dworkin, the responsibility principle does not mean that people do 
not have to care about other people and that they can do whatever they wish. His interpretation of 
the special responsibility for success in our individual lives has been further developed in a sense 
that it has to be considered not only from the perspective of opportunities and resources available 
to us, but also from  the perspective of necessary collectively-made decisions regarding which 
resources and opportunities will in fact be open to us. Consequently, the individual responsibility 
                                                           
9 "The first principle requires government to adopt laws and policies that insure that its citizens’ fates are, so far as 
government can achieve this, insensitive to who otherwise they are – their economic backgrounds, gender, race, or 
particular sets of skills and handicaps. The second principle demands that government work, again so far as it can 
achieve this, to make their fates sensitive to the choices they have made." (Ibid)  
10 Ibid. 1. 
11 Ronald Dworkin, (note 2, 2000), 6.  
6 
affects  collective  decisions  as  well,  by  taking  into  account  the  opportunity  costs  which  our 
choices place on the other participants in the "auction" (a fair distribution of resources).   
These two principles have to act in concert; they ensure that a sovereign is concerned equally 
with each citizen while leaving enough space for personal decisions and life choices.  
Dworkin intends to achieve a unified account of equality and responsibility that respects 
both, instead of, and in contrast to giving priority either to the equality or to the responsibility. 
Two  cardinal  values  of  humanism  –  the  equal  concern/importance  and  the  special 
responsibility - have been articulated in Sovereign Virtue as the most abstract formulation of 
basic/fundamental principles of political morality; they have been transformed in the book Justice 
for Hedgehogs into two basic ethical principles – the principle of self-respect and the principle of 
authenticity, which jointly build the principle of dignity. Before considering the two basic ethical 
principles,  as  articulated  in  the  Justice  for  Hedgehogs,  axiological,  gnoseological  and 
epistemological dimensions of Dworkin`s philosophical foundations, as well as his conception of 
“liberal ethics”, will be outlined. 
 
2. Status and Integrity of Values 
Dworkin’s axiological attempt aims at locating his theory of political morality “in a more general 
account of the human values … of the status and integrity of value.”
12 In this context, the relevant 
human values are those concerned with the political morality, which identify a legitimate and an 
attractive state - one which is democratic, respects liberty, realizes a just distribution of property 
and opportunity, and provides an attractive civil society. His more general account of relevant 
political  values,  such  as  democracy,  equality,  liberty,  community,  and  justice,  aims  at  an 
axiological account of their status and mutual integrity.
13  
Dworkin provides specific interpretations of the main liberal political ideals (his conceptions 
of  these  concepts).  Democracy  does  not  suggest  a  majority  rule  but  rather  a  collective 
government, in which all citizens are full and equal partners. Equality does not aim at making 
people equal in any property, such as happiness or wealth, but rather aims at making them equal 
in the costs their choices impose on others. Liberty is not a power to do what you want free from 
                                                           
12 Ronald Dworkin, (note 3, 1999), 2. This issue has already been considered in: D. Vujadinovic, “Philosophical 
Foundations of Dworkin`s Theory of Justice”, Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, Belgrade Law Review, 
2008. No. 3. 
13 Ronald Dworkin, (note 3, 1999).  
7 
an interference of others, rather it is a power to do what you want, free from such an interference, 
with a property and opportunities that are rightfully yours.  
Dworkin states that his understanding of the abovementioned concepts has to pass two tests. 
The first test demands that in each case there must be a particular kind of a reflexive equilibrium 
within the boundaries of the concept itself. On the one hand, a conception of an ideal must keep 
faith with enough of our prior convictions (value judgments based on an ideal in question). On 
the other hand, our conception of this ideal (the cardinal political value) must show why the ideal 
embedded  in  the  concept,  of  which  these  convictions  (value  judgments)  are  instances,  “is 
something good”. The second test demands an overwhelming endeavour to achieve a harmony 
between our value concepts and judgments and to ensure that “… the system of these political 
values make sense from the perspective of our philosophical ethics: our more general ideas about 
whether and why human life has value and how that value is to be realized”.
14 At this level of the 
axiological analysis Dworkin names the first test, a test of finding a reflexive equilibrium inside 
each political value,  the “test of interpretative justification”, and names the second test, a test of 
a harmonious interpretation of all relevant political values as mutually indivisible and essentially 
interconnected, the “test of interpretative integrity” of all  concepts. 
Dworkin assumes that the integrity of the main political ideals (values) represents a heart 
and  essence  of  liberalism:  “Liberalism  is  special  and  exciting  because  it  insists  that  liberty, 
equality, and community are not three distinct and often conflicting political virtues, as other 
political theories both on the left and right of liberalism regard them, but complementary aspects 
of a single political vision, so that we cannot secure or even understand any one of these three 
political ideals independently of the other.”
15  
The point of the tests of interpretative justification and interpretative integrity, or, generally 
speaking, of his axiological position, is to show how each of our main political values alone as 
well as all of them together are good, while expressing two fundamental values of humanism – 
equal importance and special responsibility - and more generally, the value of a human life and 
the ways of its fulfillment.  
The  abovementioned  axiological  position  aims  at  interconnecting  a  philosophical 
perspective (philosophical ethics) and a political perspective (political morality). In other words, 
it aims at articulating moral foundations of liberalism. 
                                                           
14 Ibid. 
15 Ronald Dworkin, (note 3, 1990), 2.  
8 
In  the  case  of  the  interpretative  concepts,  genuine  disagreements  are  possible,  because 
“…we share these concepts  not  in  virtue of sharing  rules  about  the  criteria for their  correct 
application, but in virtue of agreeing that they name a real or supposed value, and that their 
correct  application  turns  on  the  question  of  what  that  value,  more  explicitly  stated  and 
understood, really is”.
16  
Therefore, the concepts of justice, equality, liberty, and, democracy, and, in general, the 
value concepts in the fields of politics, law, and morality, impose a need for a discourse about 
values, a juxtaposition of different value interpretations, and a confrontation of these values with 
previous convictions and widely accepted intuitions about their meaning. The final result should 
be an objectively true interpretation of these “interpretative concepts” and an integrity of main 
values of political morality.  
 
2.1. Justice and Democracy 
One of Dworkin’s key points is that the concept of justice cannot be interpreted as procedural or 
“criterial” (because there are no shared rules  for its application), but  rather as interpretative. 
Justice, together with equality, liberty, and community, should be reconsidered from a standpoint 
of finding out what is good about these concepts, capturing the value of these political ideals. 
Disagreements concerned with interpretative concepts such as justice (or with a question what is 
just, or why something is just or unjust) are based on mutually conflicting judgments which count 
as substantive moral (value) arguments. 
With regard to the concept of justice, Dworkin dismisses Rawls’s comprehensive theory of 
justice, which is described as part of a larger and more general theory of personal and impersonal 
value,  and  built  on  the  “strategy  of  discontinuity”  between  ethics  and  politics.  He  connects 
Rawls’ theory of justice with the “consensual dilemma” and an attempt to achieve consensus to 
solve it. To this he counterposes his own theory of justice based on the “strategy of continuity”, 
which  he  connects  with  the  already  mentioned  “democratic  dilemma”;  his  attempt  is  not  to 
achieve  a  consensus,  which  is  unattainable,  but  a  sufficient  popularity  of  justice  inside  a 
democratic order and a consequential solving of the “democratic dilemma”.  
Dworkin  believes  that  a  sufficient  popularity  of  democratic  order  could  be  achieved  by 
insisting not on what divides us but on what connects us. He believes that the two cardinal values 
of humanism, captured in the principles of equal importance and special responsibility, have been 
                                                           
16 Ibid, 4.  
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widely shared among us in spite of our more concrete ethical and religious disagreements (and in 
spite of an “endangered” status of the value of justice).
17 These cardinal values became settled in 
the  foundations  of  our  fundamental  political  values  as  something  good.  This  essentially 
contributes to their treatment as interpretative concepts, as well as to the affirmation of integrity 
of  these  fundamental  political  values.  Ultimately,  they  lend  plausibility  to  the  concept  of 
democracy, contributing to the popularity of the democratic order as the best account of political 
justice. It is this that offers real chances for a resolution of the “democratic dilemma”. 
Dworkin  insists  on  the  reaffirmation  and  the  redemption  of  liberal  political  values  and 
democratic  order  as  the  best  framework  for  their  implementation.  He  proposes  generating  a 
sufficiently widely-shared popularity of democracy and, at a deeper level, connecting enough 
widely shared convictions about a value of human life (the two fundamental values of humanism) 
with the democratic political order.
18  
Speaking  about  an  inner  connection  between  an  institutional  question  and  an  ethical 
question, Dworkin says: “We must define democracy as that form of government in which all 
citizens have an opportunity to participate, as active and equal partners, in the political decisions 
that govern them, in circumstances that make individual consequential responsibility appropriate. 
That makes the institutional question – what institutional arrangements count as democracy, and 
which changes in these institutions count as improvement in democracy? – turn on an ethical 
question: When is it appropriate for someone to treat himself as an active and equal partner 
within a collective agency?”
19  
A political structure of democracy is, according to Dworkin, the only coercive structure of a 
state which can be consistent with people’s ethical responsibility to lead their own lives the best 
way possible. Besides, an individual responsibility of active participants in political decisions 
attributes to an idea of responsibility, not only in an individual sense, but also in a collective 
mode. We exercise a responsibility for some tasks not only individually, but also collectively.  
 
3. Character and Possibility of Objective Truth in the Field of Values 
Dworkin  develops  an  epistemological  position
20,  which  logically  follows  from  the 
abovementioned axiology, and inherits its terminology. He speaks about interpretative concepts 
                                                           
17 Ronald Dworkin, (note 3, 1999). 
18 Ronald Dworkin, (notes 2, 2000; note 3, 1990, 1999). 
19 Ibid, 15. 
20 Ronald Dworkin, (note 3, 1996, 1999 2002; note 4, 2011). See also: D. Vujadinovic (note 11).  
10 
as considered by an “epistemology of equilibrium” which seeks to affirm that certain political 
values and value judgments in general have a status of an objective truth, according to the value 
procedure of reconsidering values (including political values) from the point of philosophical 
ethics and the “face-value view of morality”.
21  
Dworkin elaborates the epistemological position of internal scepticism, which he has applied 
to human convictions in fields of ethics, morality, law, and esthetics. Internal scepticism has been 
characterized by the claim that, in the field of values, it is neither possible nor appropriate to be 
sceptical  from  the  beginning  to  the  end.  There  exist  value  estimations,  or  substantive  value 
judgements,  which  could  be  asserted  as  being  objectively  true.  According  to  the  internal 
scepticism, generally speaking, there exists value pluralism, and it is  appropriate to consider 
values in relation to their historical genesis, as well as to some kind of historical progress (for 
example, in the case of slavery).   
In the case of law there are possible substantive indeterminate judgements (claims that there 
is  no  right  answer  on  controversial  legal  questions).  Legal  assertions  might  be  substantive 
negative, positive or indeterminate judgements. According to Dworkin, indeterminate judgements 
in the field of law might be sceptical only in a sense of the internal scepticism, in the same way as 
in all other fields of values. However, he considers that the indeterminate judgements have had 
negative consequences in the field of law from the point of its internal need to reach precise 
decisions. On the basis of the abovementioned, and in contrast with contemporary post-modern 
tendecies in law, Dworkin claims that unsolvable cases in law have been very rare, and that »hard 
cases« have been solvable in principle, at a higher level of abstraction and in the framework of 
legal theory alone, as well as from a standpoint of the consistency of law with a political morality 
and philosophical ethics.  
 
4. Liberal Ethics 
Dworkin speaks about liberal ethics mostly in his “Foundations of Liberal Equality”, and less in 
the later book Sovereign Virtue. However, in Justice for Hedgehogs Dworkin did not further 
articulate his conception of liberal ethics, although he could have been expected to have done so.  
Liberal  ethics  must  be  abstract,  and  not  absorbable  by  different  individual  ethical 
convictions. Abstract liberal ethics requires that individuals “test their concrete opinions in a 
certain light.” Liberal ethics must be concerned with a sense of a good life, with abstract issues 
                                                           
21 Romald Dworkin, (note 3, 1996).  
11 
such as the following: What is the source of questions about ethics? Why should we worry about 
how to live? Whose responsibility is it to make lives good? What is the measure of a good life?  
Dworkin  says  that  the  two  fundamental  principles  of  humanism  (the  principle  of  equal 
importance and that of special responsibility) offer attractive answers to the first two questions 
regarding the source and the responsibility.  
Response to the question “Whose responsibility is it to make our lives good?” is connected 
to his statement that justice is a sovereign virtue of a political community, as well as to the 
statement that justice is a parameter of individual ethics. 
Dworkin answers the question concerned with a measure of a good life by elaborating a 
“challenge  model  of  ethics”  -  as  opposed  to  an  “impact  model  of  ethics”  -  as  well  as  by 
differentiating  between  a  “critical  well-being”  and  a  “volitional  well-being”,  and  between 
“critical self-interests” of individuals and their “volitional self-interests”. The point is that there 
exist not only egoistic self-interests, but also those which make for an inner connection between 
just acts and a critically better life. “Critical well-being” and “critical self-interests” lead toward 
an acceptance of justice as a parameter of individual ethics. This means that the “critical well-
being” supposes taking into consideration - what would be, generally speaking, a better life – also 
as individually valuable conception of a good life.
22 
The “challenge model  of ethics”,  which adopts  Aristotle’s view that  a  good life has  an 
inherent value of a skilful performance, offers a space for convictions about critical interests of 
individuals doing their best to successfully meet challenges which they face in order to make 
their life better, and to connect parameters of challenge and of skilful performance with their own 
culture and other circumstances.
23  
Living well is seen as responding appropriately to one’s situation. This is a field where the 
main  political  values  of  liberalism  and  abstract  liberal  ethics  and  concrete  individual  value 
orientations (critical interests, critical well-being, and the challenge model of ethics) encounter 
one another. Dworkin says: “Political principles are normative in the way critical interests are: 
                                                           
22 "We must recognize, first, a distinction between what I shall call volitional well-being, on the one hand, and 
critical well-being on the other. Someone’s volitional well-being is improved, and just for that reason, when he has 
and achieves what in fact he wants. His critical well-being is improved by his having or achieving what he should 
want, that is, the achievements or experiences that it would make his life worse or not to want…. [Our] project of 
finding a liberal ethics as a foundation for liberal politics must concentrate on critical as distinct from volitional well-
being.  We need an account of what people’s critical interests are that will show why people who accept that account 
and care about their own and other people’s critical well-being will be led naturally towards some form of liberal 
polity and practice." (Ronald  Dworkin (note 3, 1990), 42, 46. 
23 Ibid, 57-65.   
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the former define the political community we should have, the latter how we should live in it. 
Our search for ethical foundations is therefore a search for normative integrity.”
24  
Moral foundations of liberalism have been built in accordance with Dworkin`s “strategy of 
continuity” between a political morality (“political perspective”, the liberal account of justice as 
“equality  of  resources”)  and  a  philosophical  morality  (“philosophical  perspective”  -  two 
fundamental values of humanism, liberal ethics - followed by a “challenge model of ethics” and 
individual ethics - attached to “critical well-being”). The “strategy of continuity” has had specific 
implications  for a conception of liberalism  and also  for a  conception  of a “neutrality of the 
state”.
25 
 
5. Again on Two Fundamental Values of Humanism - Two Ethical Principles 
In his last book Justice for Hedgehogs
26, Dworkin considers two basic philosophical principles at 
the level of individual ethics, as two ethical principles: a principle of self-respect and a principle 
of authenticity, which together build a conception of human dignity. In this book he pays much 
more  attention  to  a  personal  responsibility  and  individual  ethics  than  to  political  morality. 
However, in the ending sections of the book, he again returns to the political morality and the 
interpretative integrity of all basic value concepts. 
As aforementioned, the two fundamental principles of politics are the requirement that the 
government treats those it governs with an equal concern, and the requirement that it respects its 
subjects`  ethical  responsibility.  However,  in  the  Justice  for  Hedgehogs,  Dworkin  constructs 
ethical analogues of the political principles and connects morality to the ethics more explicitly.
27  
                                                           
24 R. Dworkin, (note 2, 2000), 245. Dworkin, (note 4, 2011), 196. 
25 There are two conceptions of the relation between a political morality, individual ethics, and a neutrality of the 
state. The first is called a “strategy of discontinuity”, in which the neutrality of the state is a fundamental principle, 
and the justice matters only in a form of procedures concerned with neutral institutional regulations, having nothing 
to do with individual value orientations and with a common good. The state does not and must not concern itself with 
individual ethics (with individual value-concepts of the good). The second is called a “strategy of continuity”, 
according to which the neutrality of the state is a derived principle. In this case, a connection between a common 
good, value pluralism of individual conceptions of a good life, and justice, has been an internal one. While the 
“strategy of continuity” implies that the neutrality of the state can be compatible with a perfectionist demand that the 
state concerns itself with a common good as well as with individual value-conceptions of the good, the “strategy of 
discontinuity” implies an incompatibility between a political morality and perfectionist ethics. Two abovementioned 
conceptions essentially result in two different designs of liberalism. (See: Ronald Dworkin, note 3, 1990; note 2, 
2000) 
26 Ronald Dworkin, (note 4, 2011). See also: D. Vujadinovic, Review: R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, Annals of 
the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, Belgrade Law Review, Belgrade 2012. No. 1. 
27 R. Dworkin, (note 4, 2011), 14.  
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In this book Dworkin emphasizes that we have an ethical responsibility to make something 
good of the value of our lives, and that the ethical responsibility is objective. In addition, he 
argues that our various responsibilities and obligations to others flow from the above mentioned 
personal responsibility for our own lives. However, a responsibility to others only in politics 
principally requires impartiality between us and the others.
28 
Dworkin “rescues” Kant`s crucial insight, which he calls “Kant`s principle”, which suggests 
that a person can achieve dignity and self-respect that are indispensable to a successful life only if 
he or she shows respect for the humanity itself in all forms. “Kant`s principle” is “a template for a 
unification of ethics and morality”.
29  
The  two  ethical  principles  state  fundamental  requirements  of  living  well.  The  first  is  a 
principle of self-respect: “Each person must take his own life seriously; he must accept that it is a 
matter of importance that his life be successful performance rather than a wasted opportunity”. 
The second is a principle of authenticity: “Each person has a special responsibility for identifying 
what counts as success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility to create that life through 
a coherent narrative or style that he himself endorses”.
30  
These two principles together offer a conception of human dignity: “Dignity requires self-
respect  and  authenticity”.  Further  on,  the  idea  of  dignity  helps  in  identifying  a  content  of 
morality: “Acts are wrong if they insult the dignity of others”.  
   
6. Closing the Circle – From Ethical Responsibility to Political Legitimacy  
A path from dignity to morality, and interrelations between self-respect and a respect for others, 
Dworkin explains by “Kant`s principle”, according to which a properly interpreted self-respect 
entails a parallel respect for lives of all human beings
31, based on an objective value of any 
human  life.
32  In  that  context,  the  two  principles  of  dignity  become  closer  to  the  already 
mentioned, interpretation of the two political principles (cardinal values) of humanity: “we must 
respect the equal importance of human lives, and we have a special responsibility for our own 
lives”.
33  
                                                           
28 Ibid, 13. 
29 Ibid, 19. 
30 Ibid, 203, 204. 
31 Ibid, 254. 
32 Ibid, 260. 
33 Ibid, 300.   
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In this book, Dworkin explores a statement from his Sovereign Virtue that justice has been a 
parameter of individual ethics – in a sense that morality is essential for living well, - but also the 
other way around, that individual ethics of a certain type leads towards political morality. He 
interprets ethical principles in a way to help us to find standards/some conceptions of what it is to 
live well, that will guide us in our interpretation of moral concepts.
34   
Dworkin remarks: “In practice, the equal worth principle is usually understood not as an 
ethical principle but as a moral principle about how people must be treated.”
35 He adds: “The 
second principle of dignity demands both that I be responsible in the virtue sense and that I 
accept relational responsibility when appropriate.”
36 
Role  obligations  and  social  conventions  impose  individual  obligations  only  when  they 
respect the two principles of dignity, match ethical and moral responsibilities of individuals, and 
are means rather than obstacles for them; the conventions must satisfy independent ethical and 
moral tests.
37 
This is valid also for political obligations. However, there is a paradox of political obligation 
and a paradox of civil society: »Collective coercive government is essential for our dignity. We 
need the order and efficiency that only coercive government can provide to make it possible for 
us to create good lives and to live well. Anarchy would mean the end of dignity altogether. But 
coercive government also treatens to make dignity impossible. Some members of the community 
must exercise vast power over the rest: they must threaten punishment for disobedience, and they 
must sometimes carry out the threat.«
38  
Legitimacy of the government of a political community depends on both how a purported 
government has acquired its power and how it uses that power. Justice is a matter of sovereign 
responsibility to treat each person with an equal concern and respect. However, a government 
may be legitimate (citizens are obligated to obey their laws) even if its laws and policies could 
not be considered fully just. Justice is a matter of degree.
39  
Closing the circle of ethics and morality implies that from the central concept of individual 
ethics, we turn towards the central concepts of personal morality  – our duties to aid others and 
not to harm them, and our special duties towards friends and cousins in performative acts of 
                                                           
34 Ibid, 192. 
35 Ibid, 204, 205. 
36 Ibid, 210. 
37 Ibid, 315. 
38 Ibid, 320. 
39 Ibid, 321, 322.  
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promising.  Further  on,  we  turn  to  political  morality  and  political  obligations,  as  a  distinct 
department of value, where impartiality is necessary and where some individuals have special 
roles and powers to act on behalf of a community as a whole.  
Dworkins says: »Ehics studies how people best manage their responsibility to live well, and 
personal morality what each as an individual owes other people. Political morality, in contrast, 
studies what we all together owe others as individuals when we act in and on behalf of that 
artificial collective individual.«
40  
Ethics and personal morality were studied through the concepts of the responsibility – duties, 
obligations.  Dworkin,  however,  says  that  when  it  comes  to  political  morality  and  political 
legitimacy, rights plainly provide a better focus than duties and obligations, because »individuals 
have political rights, and some of these rights, at least, are matched only by collective duties of 
the community as a whole rather than of particular individuals«. 
There  is  a  deep  conection  between  a  pivotal  idea  of  political  legitimacy  and  the  two 
principles of human dignity and human rights.
41  
Political rights are trumps over otherwise adequate justifications of a political action.
42 The 
principles of dignity state very abstrac t political rights; they trump a government`s collective 
policies. We fix and defend particular rights by asking in much more detail, what equal concern 
and respect require. 
Dworkin`s crucial statement about political legitimacy is the following:  
»A political community has no moral power to create and enforce obligations against its 
members unless it treats them with equal concern and respect; unless, that is, its policies treat 
their fates as equally important and respect their individual responsibilities  for their own lives. 
That principle of legitimacy is the most abstract source of political rights. Government has no 
moral authority to coerce anyone, even to improve the welfare or well -being or goodness of the 
community as a whoole, unless it respects t hose two requirements person by person. The 
principles of dignity therefore state very abstract political rights: they trump government`s 
collective  policies.  We  form  this  hypothesis:  All  political  rights  are  derivative  from  that 
fundamental one. We fix and defend particular rights by asking in much more detail, what equal 
concern and respect require. That hypothesis explains the capital importance in contemporary 
political theory of certain interpretative concepts, including the concepts of equality and li berty. 
                                                           
40 Ibid, 327-328. 
41 Ibid, 330. 
42 Ibid, 329.  
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In mature democracies people almost all recognize, as an abstract thesis, that government must 
treat those it governs with equal concern and must allow them the liberties they need to define a 
successful life for themselves. We disagree, however, about what more concrete rights follow 
from these abstract ones.«
43  
Paradigmatic human right is a right not to be tortured, and closely connected are a right to a 
due process, and not to be punished innocent. 
Dworkin says that acts of torture, blatant predujice and discrimination, as well as genocide 
are against the first principle of dignity, and the rights against them support the first principle. 
The second principle of the personal responsibility is supported by a rights of free speech and 
expression, conscience, political participation, due process, religious belief.   
In accordance with his theory of the objective truth in the field of values, Dworkin claims an 
absolute truth for the theory of human rights. Basic human rights are universal, independant  of 
cultural features, and universal according to an abstract standard of dignity, which bears a 
universal truth. This does not imply that these principles are universally endorsed, but »if we 
believe in human rights at all – or in any other rights for that matter – we must take a stand on the 
true basis of such rights«.
44 
Protecting human rights through institutional procedures represents the test for a sovereign`s 
equal concern for each citizen and for political legitimacy. Human rights are also of an essen tial 
importance for interconnecting individual ethics, personal morality and political morality. In 
other words, they are crucial for establishing an interpretative integrity of democracy, morality, 
law, liberty, equality, community in a context of Dworkin`s liberal political theory of justice. 
 
III. Instead of the Conclusion 
Interpretative integrity of law, morality and politics inside Dworkin`s political theory has been 
founded  in  philosophical  ethics,  but  also  in  his  abovementioned  axiology,  gnoseology  and 
epysthemology.  Sharing  of  the  two  fundamental  principles  of  humanism  among  liberal 
individuals, both at the level of individual responsibilities for their own lives and at the level 
related to what they owe to others, and together with the obligations of a political sovereign to 
secure an equal concern for each citizen through equal respect of human rights and through a 
                                                           
43 Ibid, 330. 
44 Ibid, 338.  
17 
conduct of »equality of resources« account of justice, respresent the core elements of Dworkin`s  
conception of liberalism concieved as the »liberal equality«. 
According to Dworkin`s proposals and promises given in Sovereign Virtue, his last book 
Justice  for  Hedgehogs  was  expected  to  offer  systematically  philosophical  foundations  of  his 
theory of justice. However, that systematical and comprehensive philosophical conception cannot 
be  fully  caught  in  this  last  book,  i.e.  without  a  help  of  Sovereign  Virtue  and  other  relevant 
articles.  Nonetheless,  the  Justice  for  Hedgehogs  is  necessary  for  an  overwhelming  and  full 
understanding  of  moral  foundations  of  Dworkin`s  political  theory;  it  offers  an  analysis  and 
conceptual  dimensions  which  essentially  deepen,  enrich,  complete,  and  finalize  Dworkin`s 
political theory of justice and political philosophy. 
Books Sovereign Virtue, Justice for Hedgehogs, together with several referential articles, 
jointly  offer  philosophical  foundations  of  Dworkin`s  political  theory.  The  two  principles  of 
humanism  interpreted  as  principles  of  individual  ethics  and  personal  morality,  as  well  as  of 
political  morality,  serve  for  understanding  of  a  normative  consistency  between  pluralism  of 
individual  ethical  conceptions,  liberal  ethics  and  political  legitimacy  of  a  sovereign  political 
power. Insofar these insights serve for a better understanding of Dworkin`s specific conception of 
liberalism conceived as the “liberal equality”, and for clarifying philosophical foundations of his 
theory of justice called the “equality of resources” account of justice. 
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